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More than a quarter of a century has now passed since Herbert A. Simon 
in 1954 published his paper “Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Election 
Predictions” [6]. S’ imon’s intention was to settle an old philosophical 
dispute about the possibility of making correct public predictions in the 
social sciences-illustrated by the case of election predictions. In the 
intervening years, many authors (Grunberg and Modigliani [4], Feldman 
and Kanter [3], Brams [l], and Elster [2]) have endorsed Simon’s answer to 
the problem and no fundamental or radical criticism seems to have been 
raised against his reasoning. It is the purpose of the present paper to show 
that Simon’s paper suffers from serious misconceptions. 
Let us start by giving Simon’s own general description of the problem 
which he addressed in his 1954 paper: “Social research has often been 
attacked on the grounds that the research itself so altered the original 
situation as to make accurate predictions impossible. In this article the 
author deals particularly with the effects of public predictions and the 
adjustments necessary to account for reactions to these predictions.” 
Illustrated by the case of election predictions Simon concludes by the 
so-called Brouwer fixed-point theorem that it is possible, in principle, to 
make a public prediction which will be confirmed by the election. In his 
own words: “This proof refutes allegations commonly made about the 
impossibility, in principle, of correct prediction of social behavior.” 
Before we enter into Simon’s mathematical reasoning we ought to ask 
ourselves what Simon’s problem is all about. For the reader can with good 
reason ask the following question: How can one claim the (in principle) 
impossibility of correct public prediction of social behavior when it hap- 
pens every day that such predictions are confirmed? Because of a variety of 
institutional restrictions, laws, moral codes, customs, etc., many areas of 
social life are in fact much more predictable than are, for instance, the 
weather or earthquakes. The problem of election predictions as treated by 
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Simon concerns the possibility of making a correct public prediction 
relative to a finite scale of measurement. For example, there is only a finite 
number of fractions (or percentages) which can represent the outcome of a 
U.S. presidential election. It is thus very hard to see on which grounds one 
could claim that a correct election prediction (public or not) is outright 
impossible. 
In spite of these difficulties in clarifying and understanding what Simon’s 
problem is all about let us go on to hear what Simon has to say about it. 
REACTION FUNCTIONS AND THE BROIJWER THEOREM. 
DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Simon considers a 2-candidate election like a U.S. presidential election. 
The result of such an election may be measured in terms of the percentage 
voting for candidate A. The set of all possible percentages which may occur 
in connection with such an election is always a finite subset of the full 
interval [O,lOO]. The choice of scale is immaterial and we can as well 
suppose it to consist of n + 1 points P = { pO, pl,. . . , pn} in the unit 
interval [0, l] which divide this interval into n equal subintervals such that 
0 =po <pl < . . . <p”=landp,-pi-,=Sfori=1,2 ,..., n.Evenin 
this normalized situation we shall refer to P us the set of percentages. The 
reaction function f has P as its domain of definition and maps P into itself. 
It is defined by letting f(x) denote the actual percentage voting for A when 
x is the percentage which is publicly predicted to vote for A. Thus, all 
attention is here focused on the relation between x and f(x), disregarding 
all the other factors which influence the outcome of the election. 
Simon’s idea is that we can reasonably assume the reaction function f to 
be a continuous function of x. It is then claimed that under this assumption 
the Brouwer fixed-point theorem (or rather the intermediate value theorem) 
assures the existence of a value x0 such that f(xo) = x,, showing that the 
predicted percentage x0 coincides with the percentage which represents the 
actual outcome of the election. Thus there exists an accurate election 
prediction which is not invalidated by the voters’ reaction to this prediction. 
This “proof’ not only rests on an illegitimate use of continuous vari- 
ables, but it is also founded on the questionable assumption that facts, or 
methodological principles dealing with facts, can be established by purely 
mathematical means. We shall make further comments on both of these two 
points. 
Picturing the graph of the reaction function f in a square by taking the 
interval [0, l] as its side, the whole question seems to reduce to whether this 
graph possesses points on the diagonal through the origin or not. The 
intermediate value theorem (which is the l-dimensional case of the Brouwer 
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fixed-point theorem) tells us that this is the case if we consider the reaction 
function in an extended way as a continuous function f * of a continuous 
variable on the full real interval [0, 11. For this theorem is not valid if we 
remove points from the full interval [0, 11. Thus, in Simon’s model the true 
reaction function f appears as the restriction of f * to the discrete (finite) 
set of P percentages. However, in this situation the continuity of f * 
imposes no condition on f. In fact, any reaction function f on P is the 
restriction of a suitably chosen continuous function f * on [0, 11. In order to 
extend an arbitrary real-valued function f defined on P to a continuous 
function f * defined on the full interval [0, l] we only need to join nearby 
function values in the graphical representation of f by straight lines so as 
to obtain the graph of f *. 
In addition to this a fixed point for S* is likely to be located outside of P 
and is hence meaningless in the empirical situation at hand. Some readers 
may perhaps feel that we are overly pedantic about exactness at this point. 
But the fact is that Simon’s approach is, as it stands, also useless in the 
context of approximation. No approximate statements about meaningful 
fixed points can be made from the sole hypothesis of the continuity of the 
extended reaction function f *. Let us look a little bit more closely into 
what kind of assumption is really required for this. 
With the above normalized scale P = { pO, pl.. . p,} c [0, l] the inter- 
mediate value theorem says that any continuous mapping f * of the full 
interval [0, l] into itself has a fixed point x0 with a distance at most 1/2n 
to the nearest point pi E P. But since Simon does not assume any knowl- 
edge (beyond continuity) about the extended reaction function f * in the 
vicinity of x0 he does not know anything about the size of ]f( pi) - piI. In 
fact, there is no reason to expect that this quantity is smaller than certain 
other values of If(q) - q(, where q E P is fur away from the nearest fixed 
point of f *. Without some kind of growth condition or Lipschitz condition 
on the reaction function we cannot be sure that argument values close to a 
fixed point of f * represent “good” approximations to a “correct predic- 
tion.” 
In order to be able to say something about the size of If( p,) - piI for a 
meaningful p, E P we must know something about supi If ( p,) - f ( pi- I> 1, 
or, if you will, have a bound for the derivative of f (assuming that such a 
derivative exists). If we denote sup,]f( pi) - f( pieI) I by K6 where 6 = 
p, - P,-~ we have at least one pi E P such that 
K+l 
lf(PJ -P;l 5 -y- 6 [ 1 
where [x] denotes the greatest integer I x. The inequality (1) is the best 
possible one without further knowledge about f and it can be established by 
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a direct inspection of the reaction curve without any use of the intermediate 
value theorem. However using this latter theorem on the linear extension 
f * of the given discrete reaction function f, we can also give the following 
simple analytic proof. Assume that x0 is a fixed point for f *, i.e., f *(x,,) 
= x0. Then (pi - x01 I 6/2 for a suitable pi E P and 
V(Pi) -PiI = If*(Pi) -PiI 
’ I.f*(Pi) -f*(xO)l + lf*CxCl) - xOI + lx0 -PiI 
6 K+l 
s;KS+O+l= -6. 2 (2) 
Since lf( pi) - p,( is an integral multiple of 6 it is clear that (2) can be 
strengthened to (1). 
This simple derivation goes to the heart of the matter. It shows that, at 
this level, we cannot obtain anything better than the validity of the 
implication 
K+1 
SuPIf -f(Pi-111 5 K’ A (‘Pi)lf(Pi) -P;I 2 2 [ 1 6. (3) 
Thus, even by assuming that the extended reaction function is much 
more than just continuous, namely that it has a derivative which is bounded 
in absolute value by a constant K, we cannot claim any better approxima- 
tion to a meaningful fixed point than that given by the estimate on the 
right-hand side of (3). 
The intuitive plausibility and the psychological appeal of Simon’s con- 
tinuity argument has for more than 25 years seduced many social scientists. 
The implication (3) should be apt to remove this spell. Not only does this 
implication clarify matters on a more technical level, but it also exhibits the 
illegitimacy of jumping from this simple piece of pure mathematics to 
Simon’s conclusion: “This proof refutes allegations commonly made about 
the impossibility, in principle, of correct prediction of social behavior.” 
FACTS VERSUS MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC 
The content of (3) is purely tautological (mathematical). It says that from 
one inequality (a Lipschitz condition) we can infer another inequality 
expressing the degree of approximation to a (meaningful) fixed point. This 
is a rather trivial and purely mathematical result which will only acquire an 
interest or a relevance for the problem at hand if there exists some evidence 
pointing in the direction of a possible choice of the constant K in (3). If 
such evidence could be found, this would be the matter of interest, not the 
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easy tautological reasoning leading to (3). Due to obvious reasons it will in 
practice be difficult to get hold of even the approximate shape of a reaction 
curve. For when a prediction is made public one destroys the possibility of 
knowing what a correct prediction would have been if one had made a 
different prediction. The whole notion of a reaction function thus seems to 
be a construction of the mind which it is difficult to come to grips with on 
an empirical level. (For further elucidation of these difficulties the reader 
may, for instance, consult [5].) 
The preceding remarks raise the question: How is it possible to prove 
something about the real world-in this case about social behavior-by 
mathematics alone? For the expression “possibility of correct public predic- 
tion of social behavior” certainly does not belong in the realm of mathe- 
matics regardless of whether we add the moderating and rather unclear 
qualification “in principle” or not. Simon’s article was published in The 
Public Opinion Quurterb and did not in the least make any pretention of 
contributing to mathematics. It seems that Simon and his followers are 
products of an astonishingly persistent tradition which subscribes to the 
idea that man is able to deduce the world by thought alone-that what we 
have in our heads or scribble on a sheet of paper is powerful enough to tell 
the world how to behave. One of the more spectacular examples of this 
tradition is Hegel’s deduction, on purely speculative grounds, that there 
could not exist more than a certain definite number of planets. But Simon, 
with his virtually vacuous contention, does not risk the same fate as Hegel 
did with his very daring one. 
The more moderate and reasonable point of view is that mathematics 
only acts as a guide-albeit often a sure one-in our exploration of nature 
but that it never provides proofs for facts or for methodological principles 
dealing with facts. It is not mathematics but the empirical evidence which 
represents the final authority in this matter. Of course, it is not the first time 
that this opinion has been uttered. Let me give two quotations from two 
well-known mathematicians pertaining to this question. 
G. H. Hardy, in his book “A Mathematicians Apology,” writes as follows 
(p. 107): “It is quite common, for example, for an astronomer or a physicist 
to claim that he has found a “mathematical proof’ that the physical 
universe must behave in a particular way. All such claims, if interpreted 
literally, are strictly nonsense. It cannot be possible to prove mathemati- 
cally that there will be an eclipse tomorrow, because eclipses and other 
physical phenomena do not form part of mathematics, and this, I suppose 
all astronomers would admit when pressed, however many eclipses they 
may have predicted correctly.” 
RenC Thorn puts it this way: “One should never state that, due to such 
and such a theorem, such and such a morphology is inevitably going to 
appear. In no case has mathematics any right to dictate anything to reality. 
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The only thing one might say is that due to such and such a theorem, one 
has to expect that the empirical morphology will take such and such a form. 
If reality does not obey the theorem-that may happen-it makes the 
situation all the more interesting.” 
A clear indication of the inappropriateness of claiming to have proved a 
statement which deals with facts, by purely mathematical means, lies in the 
different conclusions one may arrive at by using different models which 
may be equally substantiated or unsubstantiated from an empirical point of 
view. Simon’s model appears, in spite of its apparent psychological appeal, 
as rather arbitrary-as one among many possibilities. In fact, an order- 
theoretical model presents itself more naturally than Simon’s continuous 
model. For in contrast to the vacuous notion of continuity on P it makes 
sense to talk about increasing or decreasing functions on P. It is also the 
notion of monotonicity which is most directly linked to the bandwagon and 
underdog effects treated by Simon. In the case of a pure bandwagon effect 
represented by an increasing reaction function a very simple case of 
Tarski’s fixed-point theorem [8] (namely its application to a finite totally 
ordered set) gives the existence of a fixed point. No such fixed-point 
theorem exists for decreasing reaction functions representing a pure under- 
dog effect. By varying the model we are thus able to produce different 
conclusions. Some of these models are adequate for demonstrating the 
existence of fixed points and others are not. 
It is somewhat ironic that Simon has chosen a model which is not 
suitable for such a demonstration. However, by changing his model into a 
probabilistic one it will at least be formally possible to derive the existence 
of a fixed point by applying the intermediate value theorem. But this 
appears to be a purely intellectual game which does not help us a bit when 
it comes to the usual discrete (dichotomy) procedure used in a 2-candidate 
election. It is a misunderstanding in this connection to point to useful 
probabilistic models in other spheres of science whether it concerns thermo- 
dynamics or game theory. A probabilistic version of Simon’s model must be 
validated on its own grounds and cannot live off the successes of faintly 
similar models which may have shown their adequacy in an empirically 
convincing way. 
The qualitative difference between Simon’s model on the one hand and 
the successful applications of continuous variables in physics on the other, 
is that the latter deal with particular functions such as rational, exponential, 
and trigonometric ones whose potential for establishing a correspondence 
between theory and empirical evidence can be tested and thus give us an 
assessment of the power of prediction the theory has relative to observation. 
It would be quite inappropriate for Simon to refer to these very efficient 
and successful uses of continuous variables in order to heighten the 
credibility and the prestige of his own quite different type of model. The 
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mere assumption of continuity is not only vacuous (in the sense that it puts 
no restriction on the reaction function) but cannot, even in principle, be 
confirmed or disconfirmed by the facts. 
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